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DRETKE V. HALEY AND THE STILL
UNKNOWN LIMITS OF THE ACTUAL
INNOCENCE EXCEPTION
Dretke v. Haley, 124 S. Ct. 1847 (2004)
I. INTRODUCTION
Can a petitioner assert actual innocence in a federal habeas petition
where he has been sentenced under an entirely inapplicable habitual
offender statute, has served considerably more prison time than the correct
sentencing statute would have prescribed, and where even the State has
conceded as much?' The United States Supreme Court confronted this
question in Dretke v. Haley and, based on a procedural technicality, avoided
resolution of this issue that has split and confounded the courts of appeals.
The Court decided that it would not even consider the merits of a
petitioner's actual innocence claim (even with a state's concession that the
sentence was statutorily unauthorized) until the district court had first heard
all of the petitioner's nondefaulted claims for similar relief as well as other
.grounds to show cause for any procedurally defaulted claims. The Court
held that lower court consideration of the petitioner's ineffective assistance
of counsel claim should have preceded review of the petitioner's actual
innocence claim, even where, in a case such as the instant one, the sentence
was indisputably impermissible.4  Whereas the Supreme Court had
previously endorsed application of the actual innocence exception to capital
sentencing cases,5 the Court here declined to resolve the circuit court split
over whether the actual innocence exception should be extended to the
noncapital sentencing context.6 The Supreme Court thus vacated the Fifth
Circuit's decision upholding the decision of the district court, which had
1 Dretke v. Haley, 124 S. Ct. 1847, 1849-50 (2004).
2 Id. at 1852.
3Id.
4id.
5 Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 339-46 (1992); Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 537-
39 (1986).
6 Dretke, 124 S. Ct. at 1851-52.
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held that the actual innocence exception did apply to noncapital sentencing
cases.
7
Notwithstanding the Court's detailed legal analysis, the practical result
for the petitioner, Haley, is that though he has already served a sentence of
four years longer than that authorized by the appropriate state sentencing
statute,8 he must continue to serve that sentence until he has first exhausted
his ineffective assistance of counsel claim.9 If the lower court finds Haley's
ineffective assistance of counsel claim to be meritorious, then Haley will be
resentenced. 10  If not, then due to his exhaustion of the ineffective
assistance of counsel claim, Haley could finally assert actual innocence.1
Only then would the Supreme Court presumably address whether the actual
innocence exception applies to the noncapital sentencing context, and only
then would Haley potentially receive the same relief that he was entitled to
all along. This undesirable result epitomizes the perils of strict form-over-
substance thinking when adopted without regard to efficiency, liberty, or
even common sense.
This Note will criticize the Court's decision and its troublesome result
on several grounds. First, not only should the Court have recognized that
the actual innocence exception applies to some noncapital sentencing cases,
but it also should have applied this exception to the instant case. The
Court's reluctance to expand habeas doctrine based on a principle of
avoidance found in Carrier12 misconstrues this precedent and the purpose
of habeas corpus itself. No habeas precedent forecloses a narrow
application of the actual innocence exception to noncapital sentencing
cases, and some past cases even endorse this result. 13 The Court should
have endorsed the Fifth Circuit's holding, which narrowly applied the
actual innocence exception to Haley's case.14 In addition, Texas's objection
to Haley's actual innocence claim as merely freestanding in violation of
Herrera15 ironically undermines Justice Rehnquist's very reliance in
Herrera that clemency should provide a "fail safe" for nonjusticiable actual
innocence claims. 16  Second, because the actual innocence exception
7 Id. at 1854.
8 See Respondent's Brief at 15, Dretke (No. 02-1824).
9 Dretke, 124 S. Ct. at 1852-53.
10 Id. at 1853.
1' Id. at 1852.
12 Id. at 1852-53 (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 495-96 (1986)).
13 See infra Part V.A.2.
14 Haley v. Cockrell, 306 F.3d 257, 263-64 (5th Cir. 2002).
15 Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 405-05 (1993).
16 Id. at 415 (quoting KATHLEEN DEAN MOORE, PARDONS: JUSTICE, MERCY, AND THE
PUBLIC INTEREST 315 (1989)).
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represents judge-made law and is subject to equitable considerations, 17 the
Court and the dissent both missed opportunities to consider the policy
implications of the majority's holding. The Court's rigid adherence to its
own judge-made temporal requirements may cause the procedural default
rule to swallow the actual innocence exception, rendering it a practical
nullity in the context of noncapital sentencings. The Court's decision is
also fundamentally unfair, because it punishes Haley for a triad of mistakes
by others: his counsel during trial, the district court, and the Fifth Circuit.
II. BACKGROUND
A. HABEAS CORPUS DOCTRINE
"A bulwark against convictions that violate 'fundamental fairness,"
' 18
the writ of habeas corpus affords prisoners the post-conviction opportunity
to challenge their confinement as unlawful. 19 Labeled "the most celebrated
writ in English law, 20 it is also one of the most contentious.21 Hardly any
other right in American jurisprudence has so repeatedly drawn the federal
and state courts more squarely into conflict.22 The ability for federal judges
with lifetime tenure to review and potentially overturn state court
convictions without giving any preclusive or res judicata effect is a
complete anomaly in American jurisprudence.23 Furthermore, it is the
precarious balance between a prisoner's right to freedom from unlawful
-confinement and a state's interest in comity and finality that continues to
avoid simple resolution today.24
The framers of the Constitution provided that "the privilege of the Writ
of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of
17 Dretke, 124 S. Ct. at 1853; Herrera, 506 U.S. at 404 (citing McCleskey v. Zant, 499
U.S. 467, 502 (1991)).
18 Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 126 (1982) (quoting Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72,
97 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring)).
19 MARTIN H. REDISH & SUZANNA SHERRY, FEDERAL COURTs 585 (4th ed. 1998).
20 ERwIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 838 (3d ed. 1999) (quoting
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARMES 129 (1791)).
21 See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 368 (6th
ed. 2002) ("Federal habeas corpus for state prisoners is, and always has been, a controversial
and emotion-ridden subject.").
22 See REDISH & SHERRY, supra note 19, at 586 (noting that habeas corpus doctrine is the
sole circumstance where lower federal courts can review and potentially overturn state court
decisions without giving preclusive or res judicata effect to them).
23 See id. ("The existence of habeas is therefore something of an anomaly.").
24 See WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 21, at 368.
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Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it."25  In 1789, the
Judiciary Act empowered federal courts to issue writs of habeas corpus for
prisoners held in federal custody and who alleged that their confinement
violated the Constitution, Treaties, or laws of the United States. 6 In 1867,
Congress extended the availability of habeas corpus to prisoners held in
state custody as well.27 With the exception of Fourth Amendment claims,
which a habeas petitioner may not raise where the state has "provided a frll
and fair opportunity to litigate" the claims,2 8 the writ of habeas corpus today
allows virtually all dispositive constitutional claims that correctly follow the
procedural rules.2 9
B. FROM FA Y V. NOIA TO WAINWRIGHT V SYKES: THE TIGHTENING OF
THE NOOSE AROUND PROCEDURALLY DEFAULTED CLAIMS
One of the more difficult questions for the Supreme Court has been
how to treat federal habeas petitioners who raise successive, abusive, or
procedurally defaulted claims.30  Specifically, the prevalence of
procedurally defaulted claims, many of which are frivolous, has forced the
Court to manage the difficult balance between a prisoner's interest in liberty
and a state's interest in comity and finality.3 1 A procedurally defaulted
claim refers to a claim that the state prisoner could have, but did not, raise
in state court in accordance with state procedural rules. 2 Federal review of
such procedurally defaulted claims presents the federal court with a
dilemma. On the one hand, it wishes to avoid disturbance of state court
25 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
26 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 81-82 (current version at 28 U.S.C. §§
2241, 2254(a) (2005)).
27 Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 27, § 1, 14 Stat. 385 (current version at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241,
2254(a) (2005)); see also McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 477-80 (1991); Wainwright v.
Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 77-82 (1977) (discussing the history of habeas corpus doctrine).
28 Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 (1976).
29 See WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 21, at 366-67 (stating that except for alleged Fourth
Amendment violations, harmless constitutional error, and some new rules of constitutional
law, all other alleged constitutional violations may serve as bases for habeas corpus relief).
30 While successive, abusive, or procedurally defaulted claims have different meanings,
the cause-and-prejudice standard and actual innocence exception apply similarly to all of
them. See, e.g., Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 318-19 (1995); Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S.
333, 338 (1992); see also WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 21, at 368 (noting that the large
number of "utterly unjustified" habeas applications puts a burden on federal courts). But see
REDISH & SHERRY, supra note 19, at 587 (stating that "habeas jurisdiction is not a significant
burden on the federal courts; only about five percent of the federal district court caseload
consists of habeas petitioners brought by state prisoners").
31 See WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 21, at 369 (illustrating the difficult balance between




decisions based on adequate and independent state law procedural
grounds.33 On the other, a federal court should strive to preserve fairness as
the predominant purpose behind habeas corpus. 34 In particular, review of a
procedurally defaulted claim in federal court presents such a difficult
problem, because it permits the federal court to address state claims that the
state court itself did not and could not have even heard.35
Fay v. Noia36 represented the Supreme Court's first detailed attempt to
outline the ability of federal courts to review procedurally defaulted
claims.37 The Court's liberal approach in this case mandated federal review
of procedurally defaulted claims except where the petitioner had
"deliberately by-passed" the state court's procedural rules. 38 In Wainwright
v. Sykes, 39 however, the Court significantly curtailed the breadth of Fay and
instead permitted federal review of procedurally defaulted claims only
where the petitioner could show "cause" for his failure to comply with state
rules requiring contemporaneous objections at trial as well as "prejudice"
arising from the alleged constitutional error.40 The Court found this cause-
and-prejudice standard sufficient to provide a safeguard against "a
miscarriage of justice. '41  The Court also reasoned that the cause-and-
prejudice standard would promote several vital interests: state court review
when witnesses' recollections were freshest, the possibility of a ruling in
the defendant's favor, enhanced ability for the state judge to make factual
determinations on federal constitutional questions, the potential exclusion
of the disputed evidence, and a higher demand on state prosecutors to
consider the admissibility of questioned evidence.42 In addition, the Court
expressed displeasure at the potential for the Fay rule to encourage
"sandbagging" where a defendant would withhold raising the constitutional
issue until federal court review.43 Subsequently, the Court extended the
33 Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 81 (1977).
34 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 697 (1984) (citing Engle v. Issac, 456 U.S.
107, 126 (1982)) ("[F]undamental fairness is the central concern of the writ of habeas
corpus .... ").
31 Engle, 456 U.S. at 128-29 (citing Wainwright, 433 U.S. at 89-90) (interpreting
Wainwright to recognize that the costs to state comity and finality are "particularly high" in
situations of a procedural default).
36 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
31 Id. at 438.
38 id.
3' 433 U.S. 72.
40 Id. at 85, 87-88.
41 Id. at 90-91.
42 Id. at 88-89.
43 Id. at 89.
20051
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
cause-and-prejudice standard to cover all claims procedurally defaulted at
the state level, not just those requiring contemporaneous objections.
44
Since a defense attorney's failure to assert a claim at the state level is
one of the easiest ways for a prisoner to default, it is no surprise that
petitioners must typically demonstrate ineffective assistance of trial counsel
in order to show cause.45 Such an argument, to demonstrate cause, must
meet the exacting Sixth Amendment standard of ineffective assistance of
counsel.4 6 That is, the defendant's counsel must have "so undermined the
proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied
on as having produced a just result.''A7 Mere failure by defense counsel to
recognize and raise every conceivable constitutional claim does not meet
this threshold.a To satisfy the prejudice requirement, a petitioner must
show that had his counsel been effective, there is a reasonable probability
that the state court's result would have been different. 9
C. AN EXCEPTION TO THE EXCEPTION: THE ACTUAL INNOCENCE
"SAFETY VALVE"
50
Despite Wainwright's limitation on a habeas petitioner's ability to
raise procedurally defaulted claims, the Supreme Court, in three 1986
decisions, later recognized that "'[in] appropriate cases' the principles of
comity and finality that inform the concepts of cause and prejudice 'must
yield to the imperative of correcting a fundamentally unjust
incarceration. ' 51 To prevent such unjust incarcerations, the Court went on
to recognize an actual innocence exception to the cause-and-prejudice
44 Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 748 (1991).
45 Wainwright, 433 U.S. at 104 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[T]he ordinary procedural
default is born of the inadvertence, negligence, inexperience, or incompetence of trial
counsel.").
46 Coleman, 501 U.S. at 753-54.
47 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984).
48 Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 486 (1986) (quoting Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107,
133-34 (1982)) ("[T]he Constitution guarantees criminal defendants only a fair trial and a
competent attorney. It does not insure that defense counsel will recognize and raise every
conceivable constitutional claim.").
49 See WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 21, at 365-66 (stating that, to show prejudice, the
petitioner must demonstrate that the errors at trial "worked to his actual and substantial
disadvantage, infecting the entire trial with error of constitutional dimension").
50 Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 271 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
51 Carrier, 477 U.S at 495 (quoting Engle, 456 U.S. at 135) (alteration in original); Smith
v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 537 (1986) (quoting Engle, 456 U.S. at 135) (alteration in




standard.52 That is, a federal court could grant habeas relief without
satisfaction of the cause-and-prejudice standard if a petitioner could show
that a constitutional violation "probably resulted" in the conviction of an
actually innocent person.53 The Court also noted that most actually
innocent habeas petitioners would be able to fulfill the cause-and-prejudice
standard.
54
In these cases, the Court confined the actual innocence exception to
assertions of innocence both of a substantive offense and of a capital
55sentence. A claim of innocence of a substantive offense refers to an
assertion that the wrong person has been convicted of the crime.56 As for
claims of innocence of a capital sentence, the Court acknowledged that the
actual innocence exception could apply to such contentions in Smith57 and
further expounded on a federal court's proper standard of review in
Sawyer.5 8 Despite noting the linguistic difficulty separating innocence of a
crime from innocence of a death sentence, the Court nevertheless found
extension of the actual innocence exception to be well-deserved.59
In Sawyer, the Court elaborated on a petitioner's burden when
asserting actual innocence of a capital sentence. 60 After the conviction of a
capital defendant, there typically exists a separate sentencing phase where
the prosecutor attempts to show aggravating circumstances justifying
imposition of the death penalty, while the defense attempts to counter with
mitigating factors.61 If a jury sentences the capital defendant to death, the
Sawyer standard provides that federal habeas review should look solely at
the aggravating circumstances to determine if there was either no
aggravating circumstance warranting the death penalty or some other detail
rendering the petitioner ineligible for the death sentence. 62 Conversely, a
petitioner, asserting actual innocence of a capital sentence, must show "by
52 Smith, 477 U.S. at 537-38; Carrier, 477 U.S. at 495-96; Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 454.
" Smith, 477 U.S. at 537 (quoting Carrier, 477 U.S. at 496).
14 Carrier, 477 U.S. at 495-96 (quoting Engle, 456 U.S. at 135).
" Carrier, 477 U.S. at 496 (substantive offense); Smith, 477 U.S. at 537 (capital
sentence).
56 Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 340 (1992).
17 477 U.S. at 537.
5' 505 U.S. at 339-45.
59 Id. at 341 ("The phrase 'innocent of death' is not a natural usage of those words.");
Smith, 477 U.S. at 537 ("We acknowledge that the concept of 'actual,' as distinct from
'legal,' innocence does not translate easily into the context of an alleged error at the
sentencing phase of a trial on a capital offense.").
60 505 U.S. at 339-45.
I ld. at 342-45.
62 Id. at 345.
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clear and convincing evidence that, but for a constitutional error, no
reasonable juror would have found the petitioner eligible for the death
penalty under the applicable state law. 63 Thus, while the petitioner must
demonstrate his ineligibility for the death penalty, the prosecutor need only
show the presence of one aggravating factor.64  The Sawyer Court thus
rejected the petitioner's argument that federal courts should review
improperly excluded mitigating factors, reasoning that a federal judge could
not reasonably deduce a jury's reaction to such considerations. 65  By
limiting the focus to the presence or absence of aggravating factors, the
Court confined federal habeas review to an "obvious class of relevant
evidence."
66
In practice, the Sawyer standard has confined success on actual
innocence grounds to an extremely narrow body of cases.67 Importantly,
the Sawyer standard for actual innocence of a capital sentence requires
"clear and convincing evidence, 68 while the "probably resulted" standard
enunciated in Carrier is the relevant burden only for the petitioner alleging
actual innocence of a substantive offense. 69  This heightened burden
coupled with the prosecution's need to show just one aggravating factor
have made asserting actual innocence of a capital sentence almost
impossible.70 More recently in Herrera, the Court has maintained its
extremely narrow focus by holding that the actual innocence doctrine does
not permit freestanding claims of actual innocence, but rather requires the
petitioner to assert a constitutional claim that underlies the actual innocence
63 Id. at 336.
64 Id. at 345.
65 Id. at 345-46.
66 Id. at 345.
67 See, e.g., Lisa R. Duffett, Habeas Corpus and Actual Innocence of the Death Sentence
After Sawyer v. Whitley: Another Nail into the Coffin of State Capital Defendants, 44 CASE.
W. RES. L. REv. 121, 135-37 (1993) (discussing how Sawyer narrowed of the scope of the
actual innocence exception in the capital sentencing context from Smith); William S. Laufer,
The Rhetoric of Innocence, 70 WASH. L. REv. 329, 382 (1995) (referring to several cases
where courts rejected actual innocence claims even though the alleged constitutional error
impeached a prosecution witness, resulted in improperly admitted evidence, and might have
affected the accuracy of a sentence); James J. Sticha, Note, To Be or Not to Be? The Actual
Innocence Exception in Noncapital Sentencing Cases, 80 MINN. L. REv. 1615, 1629-30
(1996) (noting the "extremely narrow" scope of the actual innocence exception in capital
sentencing cases).
68 Sawyer, 505 U.S. at 336.
69 Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986).
70 See Sticha, supra note 67, at 1629-30.
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assertion.71 That is, an actual innocence declaration standing alone is not a
constitutional claim, but rather acts as a "gateway" through which an
independent procedurally defaulted constitutional claim may pass.
72
D. APPLICATION OF THE ACTUAL INNOCENCE EXCEPTION TO
NONCAPITAL SENTENCING CASES: THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
1. The Second Circuit's Broad Extension of the Actual Innocence Exception
to Noncapital Sentencings
Recently, the Second Circuit extended the actual innocence exception
to a noncapital sentencing case in Spence v. Superintendent, Great Meadow
Correctional Facility.73 After conviction on a robbery charge, the trial
judge suspended the defendant's sentence, but only if he adhered to the
conditions of his probation.74 After an arrest for robbery, the trial judge
determined that the defendant had violated his plea agreement and imposed
the maximum sentence on the defendant.75 The Second Circuit, however,
noted that a jury had acquitted Spence of the robbery charge and therefore
reversed his sentence.76  The court held that, though Spence had
procedurally defaulted his due process constitutional claim, he was
nevertheless entitled to assert actual innocence of the sentence.77  In its
reasoning, the Second Circuit cited Smith for the proposition that
availability of the actual innocence exception depended not on "the nature
of the penalty," but rather on whether the constitutional error "undermined
the accuracy of the guilt or sentencing determination."7' Like the Fifth
Circuit, the Second Circuit utilized the language of Sawyer and directed the
court's inquiry to whether the petitioner had shown by clear and convincing
evidence that he was actually innocent of the prior act which enhanced his
sentence.79 However, unlike Dretke, the defendant was not sentenced under
a habitual offender statute.80 Thus, the Second Circuit's application of the
71 Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 404-05 (1993); see also id at 400 ("[Flederal habeas
courts sit to ensure that individuals are not imprisoned in violation of the Constitution-not
to correct errors of fact.").
72 Id. at 403.
7' 219 F.3d 162 (2d Cir. 2000).
74 Id. at 166.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 168.
77 Id. at 169-71.
78 Id. at 170 (quoting Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 538-39 (1986)).
79 Id. at 172 (citing Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 348(1992)).
80 Id. at 166.
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actual innocence exception has been read to apply not just to unauthorized
habitual or career offender sentences, but to all sentencing proceedings of
any kind.81 Arguably, Spence therefore deviates from the Supreme Court's
stated desire to maintain the actual innocence exception's narrow focus.
82
2. The Fourth and Fifth Circuit's Narrow Extension of the Actual
Innocence Exception to Noncapital Sentencings
United States v. Maybeck,83 the Fourth Circuit's first attempted
application of the actual innocence exception to noncapital sentencing
cases, represented a decision of ambiguity and arguable folly.84  After
agreeing to a plea agreement, Maybeck erroneously told the probation
officer that he had been convicted of armed robbery, though this in fact
mischaracterized the crime as one including violence.85 Utilizing this
incorrect information, the State increased Maybeck's criminal history
category and erroneously sentenced him as a career offender, a mistake
which neither the judge nor Maybeck's counsel noticed.86 After the district
court dismissed Maybeck's motion to vacate on the ground that Maybeck
had procedurally defaulted and failed to show cause, the Fourth Circuit
reversed.87 The court held that, regardless of whether Maybeck could show
cause for his procedural default, the actual innocence exception still applied
88and entitled the defendant to resentencing. In reaching its holding, the
Fourth Circuit reasoned that the rationale behind finding a defendant
innocent of a death sentence (endorsed in Smith and Sawyer) could be easily
extended to the noncapital sentencing context.89  However, the Fourth
Circuit's holding has been criticized, not because of the extension itself, but
because the court failed to identify any constitutional violation
81 See Petitioner's Brief at 8, Dretke (No. 02-1824).
82 Sawyer, 505 U.S. at 341 ("[W]e bear in mind that the exception for 'actual innocence'
is a very narrow exception....").
83 23 F.3d 888 (4th Cir. 1994).
84 See generally id.
" Id. at 890.
86 Id. at 890-91. While some states use the term "career offender" and others use
"habitual offender," the terms are generally interchangeable. See United States v.
Mikalajunas, 186 F.3d 490, 495 (4th Cir. 1999) ("[W]e conclude that under the reasoning of
Maybeck actual innocence applies in noncapital sentencing only in the context of eligibility
for application of a career offender or other habitual offender guideline provision.").
7 Maybeck, 23 F.3d at 890.
88 Id.
89 Id. at 893. The Fourth Circuit noted that, because the Supreme Court had applied the
actual innocence exception to the sentencing phase of a capital trial even though it "d[id] not
translate easily," there was similarly no linguistic barrier preventing similar application to a
noncapital sentencing case. Id.
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accompanying Maybeck's actual innocence claim as well as any clear
standard that guided its review.90
In its most recent case, United States v. Mikalajunas,91 the Fourth
Circuit has now apparently joined the Fifth Circuit in holding that the actual
innocence exception's application to the noncapital sentencing context
exists narrowly for erroneous career offender or habitual offender
sentencings. 92  Convicted for second-degree murder, the petitioner
challenged his sentence on the grounds that the State had improperly
enhanced his sentence on basis of the petitioner's restraint of the victim.
93
In rejecting the petitioner's actual innocence argument, the court stated that
Maybeck's endorsement of the actual innocence exception could only apply
in the context of eligibility for a career or habitual offender enhancement.
94
Application of the actual innocence exception to any sentencing proceeding,
as endorsed by the Second Circuit, would broaden the rule to an absurd
extent and counter the Supreme Court's stated desire for narrowness.95
In two decisions prior to Dretke, the Fifth Circuit assumed in dicta that
the strict Sawyer standard applied to noncapital sentencing cases.96 In both
cases, the Fifth Circuit assumed arguendo that the actual innocence
exception could apply and then stated that the petitioners' claims were
nevertheless meritless.97 The court reasoned that a petitioner asserting
actual innocence of a noncapital sentence must demonstrate that "but for the
constitutional error he would not have been legally eligible for the sentence
he received., 98 Much like a death penalty case where the petitioner must
show his ineligibility for that punishment, the court held that a petitioner in
a noncapital case must demonstrate his ineligibility for the length of his
incarceration.99 That is, the length of the petitioner's habitual offender
90 See Sean L. Dalton, Carved in Sand: Actual Innocence in United States v. Maybeck,
73 N.C. L. REv. 2388, 2404-05 ("Despite Chief Justice Rehnquist's admonition [in Herrera]
that a claim of actual innocence must be accompanied by some independent constitutional
violation, no such violation was explicitly identified in Maybeck."); Sticha, supra note 67, at
1631 ("Surprisingly, the court [in Maybeck] did not rely on any constitutional violation in
applying the actual innocence exception.").
91186 F.3d at 490.
92 Id. at 495.
9' Id at 492.
' Id. at 495.
95 Id.
96 Sones v. Hargett, 61 F.3d 410, 419 n.16 (5th Cir. 1995); Smith v. Collins, 977 F.2d
951, 959 (5th Cir. 1992) ("[A]ctual innocence in a non-capital sentencing case can be no less
stringent than the Supreme Court's formulation of actual innocence in capital sentencing.").
17 Sones, 61 F.3d at 419; Collins, 977 F.2d at 959.
9' Sones, 61 F.3d at 418 (quoting Collins, 977 F.2d at 959).
99 Collins, 977 F.2d at 959.
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sentence must have been greater than the maximum permitted under the
proper statutory sentencing guideline. 00 Specifically in Collins, the court
rejected the petitioner's actual innocence claim, because even if the
defendant had not been considered a habitual offender, the jury still could
have imposed the same sentence of life in prison.
1
3. The Seventh Circuit's Unclear Position on the Actual Innocence
Exception's Application to Noncapital Sentencings
The Seventh Circuit initially applied the actual innocence exception to
a noncapital sentencing in Mills v. Jordan,102 noting the similarities between
the habitual offender sentencing context and the capital sentencing context
in Sawyer. 0 3 In this case, the State enhanced the defendant's sentence from
two to thirty years under Indiana's habitual offender statute, which required
two prior unrelated felony convictions. 0 4 Claiming ineffective assistance
of counsel in one of these predicate felonies, Mills invoked the actual
innocence exception in an effort to obtain resentencing10 5 Though finding
that Mills had procedurally defaulted his ineffective assistance of counsel
claim and could not show cause for the default, the Seventh Circuit
concluded that the actual innocence exception applied to the petitioner's
case. 10 6 The court reasoned that there were significant similarities between
Mills's case and that in Sawyer, such as the bifurcated trial and the question
of the sentence's eligibility. 0 7 Nevertheless, the court denied Mills's actual
innocence claim, because he had actually been convicted of three prior
felonies, which rendered his possible innocence of one of those felonies
irrelevant for the purpose of the habitual offender sentence.10 8  By
analogizing to Sawyer in its reasoning, the Seventh Circuit, like the Fourth
and Fifth Circuits, appeared to adopt a narrow application of the actual
innocence exception. 109
In light of the Seventh Circuit's recent decision, Hope v. United
States," there now exists disagreement over whether this circuit allows any
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 979 F.2d 1273 (7th Cir. 1992).
103 Id. at 1278-79 (citing Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 339 (1992)).
104 Id. at 1275 (citing INn. CODE § 35-50-2-8 (1992)).
105 Id. at 1275, 1278-79.
106 Id. at 1278-79.
107 Id. (citing Sawyer, 505 U.S. at 339).
108 Id. at 1279.
109 Id. at 1278-79 (citing Sawyer, 505 U.S. at 339).
110 108 F.3d 119 (7th Cir. 1997).
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extension of the actual innocence exception at all. While not overruling
Mills, the court rejected a petitioner's successive habeas assertion of an
improperly enhanced sentence, because the Anti-Terrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) precluded such review.111 To proponents of
expanding the actual innocence exception, Hope is confined only to
consideration of successive, not procedurally defaulted, habeas petitions,
which are barred under AEDPA unless the petitioner asserts substantive
innocence of the underlying offense.1 12  To opponents, however, Hope
stands for the broader proposition that AEDPA precludes all assertions of
actual innocence from improper sentences, not just successive habeas
petitions.113
4. TheEighth and Tenth Circuit's Erratic Application of the Actual
Innocence Exception to Noncapital Sentencings
The Tenth Circuit's habeas jurisprudence epitomizes the confusion
surrounding the extent of the actual innocence exception. In United States
v. Richards,1 4 the Tenth Circuit expressly refused to extend the actual
innocence exception to a noncapital sentencing case.' 15 Like the Second,
Fourth, and Fifth Circuits, the Tenth Circuit cited Sawyer.1 16 Unlike them,
however, the court inferred that Sawyer in fact foreclosed application of the
actual innocence exception to noncapital sentencing cases.1 17 Because the
Sawyer Court stated that "in the context of a noncapital case, the concept of
actual innocence is easy to grasp," the Tenth Circuit reasoned that this
necessarily meant that actual innocence in these cases must only refer to
actual innocence of the substantive offense. 118 A couple years later,
11 Id. at 120. As amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 105, 110 Stat. 1214, 1220 (1996), the current version of 28
U.S.C. § 2255 (2005) provides:
A second or successive habeas corpus motion must be certified as provided in section 2244 by a
panel of the appropriate court of appeals to contain-
(1) newly discovered evidence that, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole,
would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable facffinder
would have found the movant guilty of the offense; or
(2) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the
Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.
112 See Respondent's Brief at 17, Dretke (No. 02-1824).
113 See Petitioner's Brief at 8, Dretke (No. 02-1824).
114 5 F.3d 1369 (10th Cir. 1993).
15 Id. at 1371.
16 Id. (citing Sawyer, 505 U.S. at 341).
117 Id. (citing Sawyer, 505 U.S. at 341).
1 " Id. (quoting Sawyer, 505 U.S. at 341).
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however, in Selsor v. Kaiser,119 the Tenth Circuit changed course and
endorsed application of the actual innocence exception to habitual offender
sentences. 20  The court cited the Seventh Circuit, and strangely not the
Tenth Circuit's prior decision in Richards, to hold that a petitioner can be
actually innocent of a noncapital sentence if he can show innocence of the
prior conviction that necessitated the harsher sentence.' 21 Two years later,
however, the Tenth Circuit went back to the Richards approach and rejected
extension of the actual innocence exception to noncapital cases. 22 In a
1999 unpublished opinion, the Tenth Circuit changed its mind again and
endorsed extension of the actual innocence exception to cover the
noncapital sentencing context. 123 With both Richards and Selsor continuing
as good law and standing for diametrically opposed conclusions, it is
difficult to know where the Tenth Circuit stands.
Like the Tenth Circuit, the Eighth Circuit's habeas jurisprudence is
quite muddled as well. In two cases prior to Sawyer, the Eighth Circuit
held that a petitioner could be actually innocent of a habitual offender
statute. 124 In Jones v. Arkansas, the court ordered a resentencing despite the
petitioner's eligibility for the same sentence under the proper sentencing
guideline. 125 Like other circuits, the court cited favorable language in Smith
that the exception should not depend on the "nature of the penalty."'126 In a
decision after Sawyer, however, the Eighth Circuit expressed doubt as to
whether Jones was still good law.' 27 Finding that the petitioner had not
advanced an alleged constitutional violation and thus violated Herrera, the
court was able to dismiss the petitioner's claim without resolving the
issue. 128 The court confirmed its confusion in Waring v. Delo,129 where it
noted that application of Sawyer's standard to the noncapital sentencing
... 22 F.3d 1029 (10th Cir. 1994).
120 Id. at 1035-36.
121 Id. at 1036 (citing Mills v. Jordan, 979 F.2d 1273, 1279 (7th Cir. 1992)).
122 Reid v. Oklahoma, 101 F.3d 628, 630 (10th Cir. 1996) (quoting Richards, 5 F.3d at
1371) ("[B]ecause '[a] person cannot be actually innocent of a noncapital sentence,'
petitioner's challenge to his recidivist enhancement does not fall within the potential scope
of the miscarriage of justice exception.") (second alteration in original).
123 Hampton v. Scott, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 14833, at *14 (10th Cir. June 29, 1999)
(unpublished opinion).
124 Pilchak v. Camper, 935 F.2d 145, 148-49 (8th Cir. 1991); Jones v. Arkansas, 929 F.2d
375, 381 (8th Cir. 1991).
125 929 F.2d at 379-80.
126 Id. at 381 n.16 (quoting Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 538 (1986)).
127 Higgins v. Smith, 991 F.2d 440, 441 (8th Cir. 1993) ("It is not clear to us that Jones is
still good law in the context of a capital case.").
128 Id.
129 7 F.3d 753 (8th Cir. 1993).
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context "raise[d] perplexing questions., 130 The court recognized that, while
language in Smith and Engle indicated that expansion of the actual
innocence exception might be warranted, other language in Sawyer seemed
to point in the other direction.1 31 The court concluded that Sawyer, at the
very least, mandated use of a narrow and objective standard where a
petitioner alleged actual innocence of a noncapital sentencing. 32  Most
recently, however, the Eighth Circuit has strangely reversed course (while
not overruling any of its past decisions) and held that Sawyer's concept of
actual innocence applied only to capital sentencings.
133
5. The Sixth Circuit's Rejection of the Actual Innocence Exception's
Application to Noncapital Sentencings
In two unpublished opinions, the Sixth Circuit has cited the Tenth
Circuit's decision in Richards and rejected any extension of the actual
innocence exception to noncapital cases. 134 For noncapital cases, the Sixth
Circuit held that claims of actual innocence were reserved only for cases
where the petitioner asserted substantive innocence of the actual offense.'35
With little in the way of reasoning, the court simply cited Richards and
Carrier as necessitating this result.
136
The post-Sawyer history reveals a divide not only among the various
circuits, but also within some circuits themselves. The Second Circuit has
adopted a broad reading and seemingly endorsed application of the actual
innocence exception to all sentencing proceedings. The Fourth and Fifth
130 Id. at 757.
131 Id. Compare Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 135 (1981) (asserting that the actual
innocence exception is directed at "the imperative of [correcting] a fundamentally unjust
incarceration"), and Smith, 477 U.S. at 539 (stating that the exception includes "any
substantial claim that the alleged error undermined the accuracy of the guilt or sentencing
determination"), with Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 341 (1992) ("In the context of a
noncapital case, the concept of 'actual innocence' is easy to grasp.").
132 Waring, 7 F.3d at 757. In this case, the court favorably noted the State's argument
that a defendant could not be actually innocent of a sentence within the statutory maximum.
Id.
133 Embrey v. Hershberger, 131 F.3d 739, 740 (8th Cir. 1997). Interestingly, the court
cited Richards in reaching its holding, a bizarre decision given that Richards was not the
Tenth Circuit's most current case on the issue. Id. at 740-41.
134 Flahardy v. United States, 1995 WL 570925 (6th Cir. Sept. 27, 1995); Black v. United
States, 1995 WL 445718 (6th Cir. July 26, 1995).
135 Flahardy, 1995 WL 570925, at *2; Black, 1995 WL 445718, at *2.
136 Flahardy, 1995 WL 570925, at *2; Black, 1995 WL 445718, at *2. The Sixth Circuit
also cited United States v. Flores, 981 F.2d 231, 236 (5th Cir. 1993), even though Flores did
not represent the Fifth Circuit's most recent interpretation given the holdings of Sones v.
Hargett, 61 F.3d 410 (5th Cir. 1995) and Smith v. Collins, 977 F.2d 951 (5th Cir. 1992).
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Circuits have taken a narrow approach and modeled their application of the
actual innocence exception after Sawyer. The Seventh Circuit initially
endorsed extension of the actual innocence exception to noncapital
sentencing cases, but its most recent decision in Hope leaves ambiguity as
to the circuit's position. The Sixth Circuit has refused to endorse such an
extension, and the capricious jurisprudence of the Eighth and Tenth Circuits
conveys perfectly the confusion and difficulty that courts have had in
attempting to define the outward limits of the actual innocence exception.
III. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. FACTS OF THE CASE
In 1997, Michael Wayne Haley, the defendant and petitioner, was
arrested for stealing a calculator from a Wal-Mart store and then trying to
exchange it for other Wal-Mart goods.1 37 At trial, the State charged Haley
with theft of property valued at less than $1,500, which as a result of his
two prior theft convictions, represented a "state jail felony" punishable by
up to two years in prison.138 The State also charged Haley as a habitual
offender due to his two prior felony convictions.139 The State maintained
that the defendant's first conviction in 1991 for delivery of amphetamine
became final prior to his commission of the second felony, a robbery in
1992.140 This timing was of paramount importance, because under Texas's
habitual offender statute, only a defendant who "has previously been finally
convicted of two felonies, and the second previous felony conviction is for
an offense that occurred subsequent to the first previous conviction having
become final.., shall be punished for a second-degree felony.' 14 1 Such
second-degree felonies carry sentences between two and twenty years in
prison. 42 Further, Texas provides bifurcated trials for habitual offender
cases. 143 Therefore, if a defendant is guilty of the substantive offense, the
case proceeds to a second penalty phase where the State carries the burden
of proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant's habitual offender
status. 1
44
13' Dretke v. Haley, 124 S. Ct. 1847, 1849 (2004).
18 Id. at 1849-50 (citing TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.03(e)(4)(D) (Vernon 2004)).
139 Id. at 1850.
140 Id
141 Id. (citing § 12.42(a)(2)).
142 Id. (citing § 12.33(a)).
143 Id. (citing TEX. CODE CRM. PROC. ANN., Art. 37.07, § 3 (Vernon 2004)).
144 Id. (citing TEX. CODE CaIM. PROC. ANN., Art. 37.07, § 3 (Vernon 2004)).
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After a jury convicted Haley for the substantive felony of theft, the
State, during the penalty phase, introduced evidence to prove that the
defendant was a habitual offender.1 45 For Haley's first felony, the State
pointed to a delivery of amphetamine felony conviction which was finalized
on October 18, 1991. For the second felony, the State described an
attempted robbery felony conviction which was finalized on September 9,
1992.146 For classification as a habitual offender under the terms of Texas's
statute, Haley's commission of this second felony had to have occurred
after finalization of his first felony conviction on October 18, 1991.147
However, the record showed that Haley had actually committed the second
felony on October 15, 1991, three days before his first conviction became
final. 148 The prosecutor, defense attorney, State's witness, jury, and trial
judge all failed to notice the three-day discrepancy, and the defense attorney
neither cross-examined the State's witness nor put on any evidence of his
own. 1
4 9
Following the penalty phase, a jury found Haley guilty of the habitual
offender charge and recommended incarceration of sixteen-and-a-half
years. 50  The trial court followed this recommendation.' 51  On direct
appeal, Haley's appellate counsel again failed to mention the three-day
discrepancy with respect to the habitual offender enhancement and did not
challenge the sufficiency of the evidence during the penalty phase. 152 The
State Court of Appeals affirmed the defendant's conviction and sentence,
and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals declined Haley's petition for
discretionary review. 1
53
Seeking state habeas post-conviction relief, Haley asserted for the first
time that he was ineligible for the habitual offender enhancement, because
the commission of his second felony occurred three days prior to the
finalization of his first conviction. 154  The state habeas court refused
Haley's petition, because he had not raised this issue at trial or on direct
appeal as required by state procedural law.155 The court also rejected the
145 Id.
146 id.












defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim, stating only that
"counsel was not ineffective" for its failure to object to or appeal the
habitual offender enhancement.1 56 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
then denied the defendant's state habeas application.
157
B. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
1. District Court Decision
In August 2000, Haley filed a timely pro se petition for a federal writ
of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, renewing both his insufficiency
of the evidence to support the habitual offender enhancement and
ineffective assistance of counsel claims.158 The State, though conceding
that Haley's insufficiency of the evidence claim was correct, nevertheless
argued that Haley had procedurally defaulted this claim by neglecting to
raise it during his state trial or on direct appeal.159 The magistrate judge
recommended excusal of the procedural default and success on the
insufficiency of the evidence claim due to Haley's actual innocence of the
habitual offender sentence. 160  In what would turn out to be a pivotal
oversight, the magistrate judge did not even address the merits of the
petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel challenge. 161  The District
Court for the Eastern District of Texas then adopted the magistrate judge's
recommendation, granted Haley's petition, and ordered the State to
resentence Haley without the erroneous habitual offender enhancement. 1
62
2. Fifth Circuit Decision
The State subsequently appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit from the district court's grant of habeas corpus in favor of the
defendant.163 The State argued that Haley was procedurally barred from
asserting his insufficiency of the evidence claim, because he had not
objected to the habitual offender sentence at trial. 164 The State further




159 Id. at 1850-51.
160 Id. at 1851.
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 Haley v. Cockrell, 306 F.3d 257, 259 (5th Cir. 2002).
164 Id. at 264.
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innocence exception still could not apply, because the instant case involved
a noncapital offense.'65
Noting its past two decisions in Sones 166 and Collins,167 the Fifth
Circuit held that the actual innocence exception did apply to habitual or
career offender sentencings and therefore affirmed the decision of the
district court.168 The court deemed Haley to be actually innocent of having
two prior sequential felony convictions, the prerequisite for a habitual
felony offender sentence enhancement in Texas. 69 The Fifth Circuit thus
agreed with the district court that Haley's sentence was "unquestionabl[y]
improper" and that "but for the constitutional error, he would not have been
legally eligible for the sentence he received."'
170
The State contended that the Supreme Court had not addressed this
issue, and that such an extension was therefore unjustified. 17 1 In rejecting
this argument, the Fifth Circuit stated that, while Sawyer expressly applied
only to the capital sentencing context, the decision itself did not foreclose
similar application to noncapital sentencing cases. 172 The court also noted
that the purpose of the habeas doctrine "is grounded in the equitable
discretion of habeas courts to see that federal constitutional errors do not
result in the incarceration of innocent persons.' 73 While recognizing the
disagreement in the courts of appeals, the Fifth Circuit sided with the
reasoning of the Fourth and Second Circuits and found Haley to be actually
innocent of the habitual offender sentence. 174 Like the district court, the
Fifth Circuit declined to address Haley's ineffective assistance of counsel
claim either as a freestanding claim for relief or as an argument to excuse
the procedurally defaulted insufficiency of the evidence claim.175  Like
other circuits in agreement, the court cited favorable language in Smith,
which stated that application of the exception should depend not on the type




166 Sones v. Hargett, 61 F.2d 410 (5th Cir. 1995).
167 Smith v. Collins, 977 F.2d 951 (5th Cir. 1992).
168 Haley, 306 F.3d at 264.
169 Id.
170 Id. at 264-65.
171 Id. at 265.
172 Id. (citing Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 345 (1992)).
173 Id. (quoting Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 404 (1993)).
174 Id.
175 See generally id.
176 Id. at 265-66 (quoting Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 537-38 (1986)).
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3. Supreme Court Granted Certiorari
The Supreme Court then granted certiorari to determine whether the
Fifth Circuit had erred in holding that the actual innocence exception
applied to Haley's case.
177
IV. SUMMARY OF OPINIONS
A. MAJORITY OPINION
The Supreme Court declined to resolve the question of whether the
actual innocence exception extended to noncapital sentencing cases,
because the district court and Fifth Circuit had both failed to consider
Haley's alternative grounds for relief first. 78 Writing for the majority,
Justice O'Connor 179 noted that Haley's alternative ground for relief, the
ineffective assistance of counsel claim, might have foreclosed any need to
reach his actual innocence claim.180  In vacating the Fifth Circuit's
judgment and remanding the case, the Court held that where a petitioner
alleges actual innocence, a federal court rqust first review all nondefaulted
claims for similar relief and other arguments for cause to excuse procedural
defaulted claims.18
The Court's fundamental rationale for refusing to delineate the
outward limits of the actual innocence exception was the "avoidance
principle.., implicit in Carrier itself, where we expressed confidence that,
'for the most part, victims of fundamental miscarriage of justice will meet
the cause-and-prejudice standard."",182 The Court indicated assurance that
the availability of ineffective assistance of counsel claims either to show
cause for a procedural default or as a freestanding ground for relief would
provide a satisfactory safeguard for petitioners such as Haley.'83 The Court
also noted the State's concession that Haley had a "viable" and
"significant" ineffective assistance of counsel argument that, if successful
on the merits, would provide him with both a freestanding claim for relief
177 Dretke v. Haley, 124 S. Ct. 1847, 1852 (2004).
118 Id. at 1849.
179 Justice O'Connor's majority was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
Scalia, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Breyer.
"0 Dretke, 124 S. Ct. at 1852.
's' Id.





and cause for his procedurally defaulted insufficiency of the evidence
claim.
184
Furthermore, and in stark contrast to the dissent's argument, the Court
noted that because the cause-and-prejudice standard and the actual
innocence exception were judge-made rules, it should exercise restraint and
expand these rules "only when necessary." 185 For the Court, to expand
these rules needlessly would be to "license district courts to riddle the cause
and prejudice standard with ad hoc exceptions whenever they perceive an
error to be 'clear' or departure from the rules expedient."' 8 6 In addition,
such unwarranted expansion would prolong federal habeas cases, as each
new proposed exception would mandate review in federal courts of
appeals.' 87 Because the State expressed willingness to permit litigation of
Haley's ineffective assistance of counsel claim prior to any new
incarceration proceeding, the Court stated that the adverse consequences for
Haley would be minimal1
88
In addition, the Court remarked that, because actual innocence claims
must present a constitutional question and because such questions
frequently involve threshold legal issues, this provided an additional reason
for restraint. 189 In the instant case, Haley predicated his actual innocence
claim on an insufficiency of the evidence due process argument that the
State's evidence in the penalty phase was insufficient to support the
habitual offender enhancement.' 90 Yet while the Supreme Court's holding
in In re Winship' 91 had previously ruled that due process required proof
beyond a reasonable doubt of each element of a criminal offense, the Court
in Dretke stated that such due process protections had not been extended to
proof of prior convictions used to support habitual offender sentence
enhancements. 192 Thus, an aversion to assessing such tough constitutional
questions provided the Court with an additional rationale for restraint. 93







9' 397 U.S. 358 (1970).




B. STEVENS'S DISSENTING OPINION
"The unending search for symmetry in the law can cause judges to
forget about justice," began Justice Stevens in his brief, but stem, dissent.'
94
Contrary to the majority, Justice Stevens had no trouble finding Haley's
insufficiency of the evidence claim to be well within the Court's due
process jurisprudence. 195 Because all parties agreed that Haley's habitual
offender conviction contained no factual basis, to Justice Stevens it
followed necessarily that he had been denied due process. 196 Unlike the
majority which was concerned with the scope of In re Winship's holding,
Stevens remained decidedly unperturbed. 197 Thus, because of the presence
of a constitutional error and the fact that Haley's sentence was
unauthorized, Stevens deemed Haley a "victim of a miscarriage of justice"
and deserving of immediate release.
198
In addition, Justice Stevens entirely rejected the majority's reliance on
Carrier which led the majority to exercise restraint when dealing with
judge-made laws, such as the cause-and-prejudice standard and the actual
innocence exception. 99 For Justice Stevens, it was precisely because these
rules were judge-made that the Court has the authority to recognize a
narrow exception for a clear case like Dretke.2 ° ° Were the actual innocence
exception grounded in a federal statute or Federal Rule of Procedure, as
opposed to judge-made law, that might have provided Justice Stevens with
a basis for judicial restraint.2 ° ' In addition, because Haley's sentence was
clearly unlawful, there was no possibility of federal court encroachment on
the principles of comity and finality, which had concerned the Court in
Carrier.2 °2
Also, like some courts of appeals that had sided with an expansion of
the actual innocence exception, Justice Stevens cited favorable language
from Engle that the cause-and-prejudice standard "must yield to the
imperative of correcting a fundamentally unjust incarceration., 20 3 If there
had been any uncertainty as to the permissibility of Haley's incarceration,
194 Id. at 1854. Justice Stevens's dissent was joined by Justices Kennedy and Souter.
195 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
196 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
197 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
198 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 91 (1977)).
199 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
200 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
20 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
202 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).




Justice Stevens conceded that requiring him to seek other avenues for
comparable relief might make sense.2 °4 But because Haley would be
entitled to a writ regardless of the outcome of a cause-and-prejudice
inquiry, the majority "perversely prolong[ed] the very injustice that the
cause and prejudice standard was designed to prevent.,
20 5
As a final note, Justice Stevens criticized the State for admitting to the
sentencing error and then opposing the grant of habeas relief in this case.20 6
Justice Stevens questioned whether the State had forgotten its duty to
provide justice for its citizens.20 7
C. KENNEDY'S DISSENTING OPINION
In addition to joining Justice Stevens' dissent, Justice Kennedy added
his own brief dissent to comment on and sternly criticize the conduct of the
State and the prosecutor.208 Justice Kennedy expressed displeasure that the
State would even oppose Haley's habeas petition and desire to imprison
him for a sentence they agree was unlawful.20 9 The State should have
allowed Haley's writ of habeas corpus to proceed unopposed all the while
taking affirmative steps to set him free. 210 The State's unwillingness to use
its clemency power caused Justice Kennedy to remark that "[e]xecutive
discretion and clemency can inspire little confidence if officials sworn to
fight injustice choose to ignore it."'211 Though there might have been an
important legal interest in the comity and finality of state sentences, Justice
Kennedy stated that there was a far greater interest in Haley's liberty, which
the State should have served in the first place.212
V. ANALYSIS
The Dretke majority, instead of deciding whether the actual innocence
exception applies to the noncapital sentencing context, remanded the case
on a procedural technicality.2 3 In refusing to answer this issue that has
204 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
205 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
206 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
207 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 111 (1976)
(noting that the actions of Texas "might cause some to question whether the State has
forgotten its overriding 'obligation to serve the cause of justice').
208 Id. at 1856 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
209 Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
210 Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
211 Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
212 Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
213 Id. at 1849.
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split and perplexed the courts of appeals, the Supreme Court has prolonged
not only a disturbing lack of clarity within its habeas jurisprudence, 214 but
also the injustice of Haley's habitual offender sentence itself. This Note
criticizes the Court's decision on several fronts. First, the Court's reliance
on the avoidance principle in Carrier and its extreme reluctance to carve
out a narrow exception for Haley's case215 misinterprets Carrier and the
purpose of the actual innocence exception itself. Second, the Court should
have found the actual innocence exception applicable to certain noncapital
cases that satisfy a standard analogous to Sawyer's strict test for capital
sentencing cases. Such an application finds support in Engle, Carrier,
Smith, and Herrera while Sawyer, contrary to the reasoning by some
216circuits, does not preclude such a result. Third, the Court should have
determined that Haley's case fits within a narrow and strict application of
the actual innocence exception, because the factual and procedural posture
of Dretke is analogous to that in capital cases, where Sawyer has previously
endorsed application of the actual innocence exception.217 Fourth, Texas's
refusal to grant clemency and its opposition to Haley's insufficiency of the
evidence claim as a freestanding claim of innocence in violation of Herrera
ironically undermines Herrera's very reliance on clemency to prevent
miscarriages of justice.218
In addition, forcing Haley and other petitioners in his situation to
exhaust ineffective assistance of counsel claims and other arguments for
cause runs counter to policy and equitable considerations at the heart of
habeas doctrine.219 The court's strong reliance on Haley's "viable" and
"significant" ineffective assistance of counsel claim to provide comparable
relief may lead the cause-and-prejudice inquiry to swallow the actual
innocence exception for all practical purposes.220  Furthermore, the
majority's holding punishes Haley for the mistakes of his attorney, the
district court, and the Fifth Circuit, not himself.
214 See supra Part II.D.
215 Dretke, 124 S. Ct. at 1852-53 (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 495-96
(1986)) (internal citations omitted).
216 See supra Parts I.D.4-5.
217 Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 340-41 (1992).
218 Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390,404-17 (1993).
219 Dretke, 124 S. Ct. at 1853; Herrera, 506 U.S. at 404 (citing McCleskey v. Zant, 499
U.S. 467, 502 (1991)).
220 Dretke, 124 S. Ct. at 1853.
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A. THE COURT SHOULD HAVE ENDORSED APPLICATION OF THE
ACTUAL INNOCENCE EXCEPTION TO HALEY'S CASE
Due to the Supreme Court's unwillingness to define the outward extent
of the actual innocence exception, a lower federal court will now have to
address Haley's ineffective assistance of counsel claim.22' A court will
have to review the actions of Haley's counsel at trial both as a freestanding
claim of relief and as an argument to provide cause for the procedurally
defaulted insufficiency of the evidence claim.222 Regardless of whether a
court considers the ineffective assistance of counsel assertion as a
freestanding claim of relief or as an argument for cause, the inquiry is
essentially the same.223  That is, a petitioner must show that his
representation amounted to a Sixth Amendment violation in either case.224
Because a freestanding Sixth Amendment violation would entitle Haley to
resentencing,225 a federal court would avoid answering the actual innocence
question if it were to find merit in Haley's ineffective assistance of counsel
claim. 226 Only if Haley's ineffective assistance of counsel claim cannot
meet the Sixth Amendment standard would a federal court have to consider
Haley's actual innocence assertion,227 and only then would Haley
potentially receive the resentencing that he was entitled to from the
beginning.
Though the Supreme Court found comfort for this strict form-over-
substance thinking in Carrier,228 such comfort was misplaced. The Court
should have allowed federal courts to consider a petitioner's actual
innocence claim contemporaneously with his other claims, where the
sentencing error is incontrovertible or conceded by the State. The Supreme
Court then should have held that the actual innocence exception applies to
certain improper habitual or career offender sentences like Haley's, which
fulfill a strict standard analogous to that found in Sawyer. In fact, the
State's objection to Haley's insufficiency of the evidence claim as a mere
freestanding claim of innocence precluded by Herrera not only raises
troubling questions about Texas's view towards clemency, but also
221 Id. at 1852.
222 Id.
223 Id. at 1853; Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752 (1991); Murray v. Carrier, 477
U.S. 478, 492 (1986) ("Attorney error short of ineffective assistance of counsel does not
constitute cause for a procedural default ... ").
224 Coleman, 501 U.S. at 752; Carrier, 477 U.S. at 488.
225 Dretke, 124 S. Ct. at 1853.
226 Id.
227 Id. at 1852.
228 Id. at 1852-53 (quoting Carrier, 477 U.S. at 495-96) (internal citations omitted).
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undermines the Herrera Court's assurance that clemency should prevent
miscarriages of justice outside the scope of constitutional mandate.229
1. The Court's Reliance on the Carrier Avoidance Principle was Misguided
Despite the difference of interpretation among the courts of appeals,
the Supreme Court in Dretke avoided resolution of the split by relying on
the "avoidance principle... implicit in Carrier itself, where we expressed
confidence that, 'for the most part, victims of fundamental miscarriage of
justice will meet the cause-and-prejudice standard.' ' 230 The majority then
cited Carrier's reasoning that the availability of ineffective assistance of
counsel claims either to show cause for a procedurally defaulted claim or as
a freestanding claim for relief provided an adequate safeguard against
miscarriages of justice. 231  The majority also acknowledged Haley's
"significant" and "viable" ineffective assistance of counsel claim, as
conceded by the State.232 Noting that the State would not attempt to bar
Haley from asserting this claim, the Court appeared confident that success
on this merit would provide Haley with all the relief he sought.233
Yet the issue presented in Dretke differed noticeably from that in
Carrier and is, in fact, quite unique. The Court in Dretke correctly noted
that federal habeas review of freestanding constitutional claims and
arguments for cause does, as a general rule, precede review of actual
innocence.234 The Court's reliance on this general rule and on Carrier for
guidance, 235 however, represented an oversimplification of the issue
presented by Dretke. In Carrier, the petitioner was convicted of rape and
abduction in state court.236 The petitioner's habeas application then raised
only a procedurally defaulted claim that the prosecution had denied him due
process of law by withholding statements made by the victims. 237 To show
cause for this default, the petitioner asserted that his counsel neglected to
include the proper discovery claim at the state appeals level.2 38 A divided
Fourth Circuit agreed with the petitioner and remanded the case on the
229 Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390,404-17 (1993).
230 Dretke, 124 S. Ct. at 1852 (quoting Carrier, 477 U.S. at 495-96) (internal quotations
omitted).
231 Id. (quoting Carrier, 477 U.S. at 495-96) (internal quotations omitted).
232 Id. at 1853.
233 Id.
234 Id. at 1852.
235 id.
236 Carrier, 477 U.S. at 482.
237 Id.
238 Id. at 483.
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grounds that even if this single omission by counsel did not rise to the level
of a Sixth Amendment violation, it could still show cause.239 The Supreme
Court reversed the Fourth Circuit's decision and held that to demonstrate
cause for a procedurally defaulted claim, a habeas petitioner must
demonstrate that his counsel's ineffectiveness rose to the level of a Sixth
Amendment violation.240 The Court then went on to state:
[Flor the most part, "victims of a fundamental miscarriage of justice will meet the
cause-and-prejudice standard." But we do not pretend that this will always be true.
Accordingly, we think that in an extraordinary case, where a constitutional violation
has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent, a federal
habeas court may Prant the writ even in the absence of a showing of cause for the
procedural default.
4 1
The important fact is that in the factual posture of Carrier, the
petitioner never even raised an actual innocence claim.242 Furthermore,
unlike Dretke, the petitioner never raised an actual innocence claim that, if
allowed, was incontrovertible. Dretke presented the unique situation where
a habeas petitioner raised a freestanding claim, a procedurally defaulted
claim, and an actual innocence assertion that, if allowed, was
indisputable.243 To require Haley to jump through the procedural hoop of
first asserting ineffective assistance of counsel both as a freestanding claim
and as an argument to show cause was to oversimplify the issue and rely on
precedent that did not even consider this precise issue. 244 The issue, had it
been properly framed by the Supreme Court, would have asked whether a
habeas petitioner asserting freestanding claims, procedurally defaulted
claims, and irrefutable sentencing error must adhere to the traditional
requirement of first exhausting nondefaulted and defaulted claims before
asserting actual innocence. In the Court's own past words, the purpose of
habeas corpus is to "correct a fundamentally unjust incarceration., 245 It
would seem especially odd that the same Court, which stated that the
purpose of habeas corpus was to correct fundamentally unjust
incarcerations, would not similarly extend this purpose to prevent the
unnecessary continuation of fundamentally unjust incarcerations as well.
239 Id. at 484.
240 Id. at 488.
241 Id. at 495-96 (quoting Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 135 (1982)).
242 Id. at 482-83.
243 Dretke v. Haley, 124 S. Ct. 1847, 1850-51 (2004).
244 Id. at 1852.
245 Engle, 456 U.S. at 135.
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2. The Court's Precedents in Smith, Carrier, Sawyer, and Herrera Do Not
Foreclose Application of the Actual Innocence Exception to a Narrow Body
of Noncapital Sentencing Cases
Had the Court held that a petitioner can assert actual innocence
contemporaneously with nondefaulted and defaulted claims in the unique
situation where a sentencing error is manifest, the next question would have
been whether the actual innocence exception itself can apply to noncapital
sentencing cases. As demonstrated by the circuit court split, those courts
endorsing such application rely on language in Engle, Smith, Sawyer, and
Herrera while those circuits rejecting this application state that Sawyer, in
fact, precludes this result.246  Engle, Smith, and Herrera all provide
evidence that such application is warranted, and the language in Sawyer is
inconclusive. The net result is that, because no language in Supreme Court
precedent explicitly precludes application of actual innocence in Dretke, the
Fifth Circuit correctly considered such a possibility open for resolution.247
In Engle, a case prior to the express application of actual innocence to
capital sentencing cases, the Court stated that in appropriate cases, the
cause-and-prejudice standard "must yield to the imperative of correcting a
fundamentally unjust incarceration.248 Such language did not differentiate
between incarceration due to a capital sentence and that due to a noncapital
sentence, and provided evidence that, at least to the Engle Court, actual
innocence could exist in noncapital sentencing cases. A few years later, in
Smith, the Court cited the Engle language favorably and provided its own
language indicative of the intent behind the actual innocence exception.249
The Court noted that it was appropriate to enforce the cause-and-prejudice
standard "in cases devoid of any substantial claim that the alleged error
undermined the accuracy of the guilt or sentencing determination."250 In
Herrera, which the Fifth Circuit quoted,25' the Court found the actual
innocence exception to be "grounded in the 'equitable discretion' of habeas
courts to see that federal constitutional errors do not result in the
incarceration of innocent persons. 252 In all of these cases, the Supreme
246 See supra Part IID.
247 Haley v. Cockrell, 306 F.3d 257, 265 (5th Cir. 2002). See Sticha, supra note 67, at
1634-37 for an in-depth argument that habeas precedent does not preclude extension of the
actual innocence exception to noncapital sentencing cases.
248 Engle, 456 U.S. at 135 (emphasis added).
249 Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 538-39 (1986).
250 Id. (emphasis added).
251 Haley, 306 F.3d at 265 (quoting Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 404 (1993)).




Court did not once qualify that only certain types of sentences,
incarcerations, or punishments warranted habeas relief while others did not.
Sawyer does present more confusing language than Engle, Smith, and
Herrera, and circuit courts both sides of the divide haved cited it as
support.25 3 Sawyer contains two critical passages, one of which might
support extension of the actual innocence exception and the other which
might not. On the one hand, the Sawyer Court noted that "the phrase
'innocent of death' is not a natural usage of those words," but nevertheless
applied the actual innocence exception to capital sentencing cases.254 Thus,
to circuits supporting an extension of the actual innocence exception, the
Supreme Court's extension of the actual innocence exception to capital
sentencing cases despite the linguistic barrier similarly overcame any
possible hurdle preventing application to noncapital cases.2 55 On the other
hand, the Sawyer Court also stated that "in the context of a noncapital case,
the concept of 'actual innocence' is easy to grasp. 256 Thus, to circuits
opposing any extension of the actual innocence exception, this meant that
actual innocence in a noncapital sentencing case could only refer to the
defendant's substantive guilt or innocence, not the validity of the sentencing
itself.
257
In upholding the district court's decision to vacate Haley's sentence,
the Fifth Circuit relied on favorable language in Smith and Herrera.258 The
Fifth Circuit also noted that Sawyer did not expressly preclude extension of
actual innocence claims to the noncapital sentencing context.259 Objective
consideration of all the language in Engle, Smith, Sawyer, and Hererra does
reflect, at best, an endorsement of the result reached by the Fifth Circuit. At
worst, the totality of language is inconclusive due to one passage in
Sawyer.260  Therefore, the Fifth Circuit correctly noted that nothing
precluded an extension of the actual innocence exception to Haley's case
and proceeded to analyze the facts of Haley's argument.
253 See supra Part II.D.
254 Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 341 (1992).
255 See supra Parts II.D. 1-2.
256 505 U.S. at 341.
257 See, e.g., Waring v. Delo, 7 F.3d 753, 757 (8th Cir. 1993) (interpreting Sawyer to
mean that "there may be no exception for procedurally barred noncapital sentencing claims,
unless one is innocent of the crime").
258 Haley v. Cockrell, 306 F.3d 257, 265 (5th Cir. 2002) (quoting Herrera v. Collins, 506
U.S. 390, 404 (1993)); id. at 266 (quoting Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 537-38 (1986)).
259 Id. at 265 (citing Sawyer, 505 U.S. at 345).
260 505 U.S. at 341.
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3. The Court Should Have Applied a Strict Standard Analogous to that in
Sawyer in Haley's Case
In illustrating its standard of review for Haley's actual innocence
argument, the Fifth Circuit ruled that a petitioner asserting actual innocence
of a noncapital sentence must show that "but for the constitutional error, he
would not have been legally eligible for the sentence he received.
261
Unlike the absence of a clearly defined rule in the Fourth Circuit's Maybeck
decision,262 for example, the Fifth Circuit adopted Sawyer's language in
analogous form.263 In keeping with the Supreme Court's desire to keep the
actual innocence exception narrow,264 this Note argues that the Fifth Circuit
got it right.
In his 1996 article, James Sticha also endorsed application of the
Sawyer rule to noncapital sentencing cases and indicated that such
application implicitly contained four elements. 265 First, application would
be confined to noncapital cases where the offender is sentenced in a stage
separate from the guilt-or-innocence phase.266 This element would thus
adhere to the Sawyer Court's desire to confine federal review to an
"obvious class of relevant evidence. 267  Much like death penalty cases
where the State must simply show the presence of one aggravating factor,
here federal courts would simply look at whether the State demonstrated the
requisite number or sequence of prior felonies justifying the sentencing
enhancement. In addition, because most noncapital cases do not involve
separate sentencing phases, such a narrow extension would not have a
deleterious effect on the federal docket. 268 The exception thus would be
confined mainly to habitual or career offender cases like Dretke with
bifurcated trials. Second, the petitioner would have to maintain a
constitutional violation.269  This requirement would comport with the
Herrera rule that habeas petitioners may not simply assert freestanding
261 Haley, 306 F.3d at 264-65.
262 United States v. Maybeck, 23 F.3d 888 (4th Cir. 1994); see supra note 90 and
accompanying text (highlighting criticism of the Maybeck decision).
263 Haley, 306 F.3d at 264-65.
264 Sawyer, 505 U.S. at 341; see supra note 82.
265 Sticha, supra note 67, at 1637-39 (recommending adoption of the Sawyer standard for
noncapital sentencing cases).
266 See id. at 1638.
267 Sawyer, 505 U.S. at 345.
268 See Sticha, supra note 67, at 1636. Noncapital cases normally do not involve a
separate sentencing stage resembling the guilt-or-innocence stage, and a number of factors
determine the sentencing range. Therefore, under this inquiry, the actual innocence
exception would not apply to most noncapital cases. Id.
269 See id. at 1637.
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claims of innocence, but must demonstrate an independent constitutional
violation underlying the actual innocence.270 Third, the petitioner would
have to meet the higher burden of "clear and convincing evidence" required
in Sawyer,27' not the lesser "probably resulted" burden required for actual
innocence of a substantive offense.272 Fourth, the petitioner would have to
show that his incarceration period exceeded the maximum permissible
under the appropriate sentencing guideline, and therefore that no reasonable
juror could have imposed that sentence.273 Incursions into a state court's
comity and finality could hardly be present where a federal judge simply
compares the number of days in a petitioner's habitual or career offender
sentence with the maximum number of days permitted under the
appropriate sentencing statute.
Dretke can potentially fulfill all of these elements. First, Haley's trial
was bifurcated, and the State cannot show the requisite sequence of prior
finalized felonies warranting a habitual offender sentence.274 Second, Haley
maintained that the unjust result occurred due to insufficiency of the
evidence, a possible constitutional claim. 275 This, in fact, is the only
element that Haley cannot unquestionably pass. The Dretke majority
declined to address whether an insufficiency of the evidence claim in the
habitual offender sentencing context fell within the Supreme Court's due
process jurisprudence laid out in In re Winship and Jackson v. Virginia,276
while the dissent contended that it clearly did. 77 Third, because October 15
comes before October 18, Haley demonstrated by clear and convincing
'evidence that but for the insufficiency of the evidence, he was not legally
eligible for a sentence of sixteen years and six months.278 Fourth, because
Haley's sixteen-and-a-half-year sentence exceeded the maximum two-year
sentence permitted under the correct sentencing statute, no reasonable juror
could have imposed such a sentence.279  Thus, even under a strict and
objective application of the actual innocence exception to noncapital
270 Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 416 (1993).
271 505 U.S. at 336.
272 Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478,496 (1986).
273 See Sticha, supra note 67, at 1637.
274 Haley v. Cockrell, 306 F.3d 257, 260 (5th Cir. 2002).
275 Id. at 266-67.
276 Dretke v. Haley, 124'S. Ct. 1847, 1853 (2004) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.
307 (1979); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970)). The State argued that Haley merely
asserted a freestanding constitutional claim, which was impermissible under Herrera.
Petitioner's Brief at 35-39, Dretke (No. 02-1824).
277 Dretke, 124 S. Ct. at 1854 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
278 Haley, 306 F.3d at 264-65.
279 Dretke, 124 S. Ct. at 1850.
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sentencing cases, Haley has a powerful case for relief, subject only to
resolution of his insufficiency of the evidence argument as a due process
constitutional claim.
4. Texas's Failure to Grant Clemency Undermines Herrera's Reliance on
Executive Clemency as Providing a "Fail Safe "280
In its brief before the Supreme Court, Texas carefully analyzed the
Court's past due process jurisprudence in an effort to discount Haley's
insufficiency of the evidence assertion as a mere freestanding claim of
innocence.2 81 As held in Herrera, a habeas petitioner may only use the
actual innocence exception as a "gateway" through which his otherwise
procedurally defaulted constitutional claim may pass.282 A petitioner may
not utilize the actual innocence exception without an independent
constitutional claim. 283  To Texas, Haley's actual innocence and
insufficiency of the evidence claims were, in reality, one and the same,
posing no cognizable due process constitutional argument.284 The Supreme
Court neither agreed nor disagreed, managing instead to postpone
resolution of this "difficult" constitutional question because of the Fifth
Circuit's alleged procedural error.285 There is, however, a distinct irony that
underlies and pervades through the State's entire argument. Justice
Rehnquist's hook in Herrera placed reliance on the fact that, even if a
petitioner's claim were freestanding, a state would use its executive
clemency power as a "fail safe" in appropriate instances.286 Thus, while
Texas can find support in Herrera's general rule of law precluding non-
constitutional actual innocence assertions, 87 it can find no similar support
for its failure to exercise executive clemency.
In Herrera, the petitioner attempted, but ultimately failed, to utilize the
actual innocence exception by citing newly discovered evidence in the form
of several affidavits.288  The Herrera Court declined to allow the
petitioner's actual innocence assertion, because the presentation of this
280 Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390,415 (1993) (quoting MOORE, supra note 16, at 315).
281 Petitioners Brief at 36, Dretke (No. 02-1824) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.
307 (1979)).
282 506 U.S. at 403.
283 Id. at 404 ("[A] claim of 'actual innocence' is not itself a constitutional claim ....
284 Petitioners Brief at 37, Dretke (No. 02-1824).
285 Dretke, 124 S. Ct. at 1854.
286 506 U.S. at 415 (quoting MOORE, supra note 16, at 315).
287 Id. at 404-05.
288 Id. at 396-97.
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newly discovered evidence posed no independent constitutional claim. 289
The Court reasoned that such consideration necessarily fell outside the
scope of federal courts.290 Yet this did not mean that when pertinent newly
discovered evidence emerges, a petitioner should be without any recourse.
Justice Rehnquist cautioned that the justice system can still be fallible even
when a defendant's constitutional rights are upheld.291 In these uncommon
circumstances, he reasoned that the provider of such relief should not be
federal habeas judges tasked with the correction of constitutional
violations,292 but rather the states through use of their clemency power.293
Justice Rehnquist's reliance on the clemency power was not a mere
pipedream that states would administer mercy only when they so desired.
Rather, clemency "[wa]s the historic remedy for preventing miscarriages of
justice where judicial process has been exhausted., 294 Justice Rehnquist
then surveyed the rich history of clemency and expressed strong confidence
that this state power would provide a "fail safe" against miscarriages of
justice. 295
Though not a constitutional mandate, the majority of states today and
all of the states with the death penalty, including Texas, have provisions for
clemency. 96 While the exercise of clemency in Texas has been the subject
of much criticism, most of the criticism has focused on death penalty cases,
where there exists newly uncovered exculpatory evidence.2 97 Whatever the
merit of the exculpatory evidence in these cases, such situations have
usually involved great complexity, including intricate eyewitness testimony,
expert testimony, and often jury inferences. In Texas's defense, there exists
an inherent difficulty in using hindsight to weigh a jury's potential reaction
to newly discovered exculpatory evidence. Therefore, these complex
289 Id at 400.
290 Id; see supra note 71.
291 Herrera, 506 U.S. at 415.
292 Id. at 400.
293 Id at 411.
294 Id at 412.
295 Id. at 415 (quoting MOORE, supra note 16, at 315).
296 Id. at 414; TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE. ANN. § 48.01 (Vernon 2004).
297 See, e.g., Stephen E. Silverman, There is Nothing Certain Like Death in Texas: State
Executive Clemency Boards Turn a Deaf Ear to Death Row Inmates' Last Appeals, 37 ARIz.
L. REv. 375 (1995); James C. Harrington, Texas Needs an Effective Clemency Process, TEX.
LAW., June 14, 1993, at 17; Gabrielle K. McDonald et al., Texas Clemency "Sorely
Inadequate, " TEX. LAW., May 17, 1993, at 10; Mike Ward, Clemency Policy Seen as 'Empty
Gesture,' AusTN AM.-STATESMAN, June 2, 1999, at Al; Jim Henderson, Controversy Dogs
Actions of the State's Parole Board, HOUSTON CHRON., Jan. 10, 1999, at 1E; Bruce
Tomasco, States Grant Clemency Sparingly; Texas Tough but Not Alone in Secrecy, DALLAS
MORNING NEWs, Jan. 10, 1999, at 35A.
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circumstances make objective analysis of whether a jury would have found
guilt or innocence extremely difficult. In stark contrast, Dretke presents no
such complexity. It, in fact, represents the highly unusual situation where
there are no disagreeing expert witnesses, no contradictory eyewitnesses,
and nothing else that would impede an objective analysis of whether a
miscarriage of justice exists. The matter in Dretke concerns only the
validity of a sentence: whether October 15 comes before October 18 and
whether sixteen-and-a-half years exceeds four.
While Texas objected to Haley's actual innocence assertion mainly on
the federalist principles of comity and finality, these principles cannot
similarly explain a refusal to grant clemency. Clemency is
nonjusticiable,298 and state statutes usually provide little in the way of
substantive guidance. 299 The only plausible explanation for withholding
clemency is that Texas does not believe a miscarriage of justice has
occurred in this case.300 Indeed, the language of the State's petition
confirms this result. To Texas, the fact that Haley committed his second
felony "three days too early" is a matter of technicality, not innocence.0 1
Yet as countered by Justice Kennedy in dissent, "the difference between
violating or not violating a criminal statute cannot be shrugged aside as a
minor detail. 30 2  Texas's keen reliance on Herrera as a bar to Haley's
insufficiency of the evidence claim is indeed double-edged. For if the State
views Herrera as a golden rule that, on the one hand, bars freestanding
actual innqcence claims, then it also must undoubtedly consider Justice
Rehnquist's strong reliance on clemency.30 3 Either Texas should have
granted clemency, or Justice Rehnquist's words of caution in Herrera ring
empty.
298 Herrera, 506 U.S. at 412.
299 See Silverman, supra note 297, at 386 ("[W]hen state supreme courts have considered
the [clemency] issue, they tend to allow executive clemency authorities to exercise the power
in any manner that they see fit."); Steve Woods, A System Under Siege: Clemency and the
Texas Death Penalty After the Execution of Gary Graham, 32 TEx. TECH L. REV. 1145, 1188
(2001) ("Neither the Texas Constitution nor Texas statutes define precisely what the purpose
[of clemency] is; they simply give the governor the power to exercise it within the bounds of
the Board.").
300 See Jeff Bleich, Supreme Court Watch: Actual Innocence, 30 SAN FRANCIsco ATT'Y
43,44 (2004).
301 See Petitioner's Brief at 10, 22, Dretke v. Haley, 124 S. Ct. 1847 (2004) (No. 02-
1824).
302 Dretke v. Haley, 124 S. Ct. 1847, 1856 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
303 Herrera, 506 U.S. at 404-17.
[Vol. 95
DRETKE v. HALEY
B. THE RESULT IN DRETKE MAY LEAD TO UNDESIRABLE
CONSEQUENCES
Rather than entertain Haley's actual innocence claim and his
unauthorized sentence of sixteen-and-a-half years, the Court in Dretke took
undue comfort in the fact that "for the most part victims of fundamental
miscarriage of justice will meet the cause-and-prejudice standard. 3 °4 That
is, because Haley's ineffective assistance of counsel claim was "viable" and
"significant,, 30 5 the Court had no trouble forcing him to exhaust this
argument both as a freestanding claim and as a way to show cause for his
procedurally defaulted insufficiency of the evidence claim. Yet habeas
doctrine is an equitable one,306 and the majority and dissent both missed
opportunities to consider the practical and ill-advised consequences of the
majority's rule.
1. The Court's Holding May Lead the Cause-and-Prejudice Standard to
Swallow the Actual Innocence Exception in Noncapital Sentencing Cases
One plausible implication of the Court's decision in Dretke is that the
Court's recognition of Haley's "significant" and "viable" ineffective
assistance of counsel claim 307 may cause the cause-and-prejudice standard
to sap the actual innocence exception of any practical meaning in the
noncapital sentencing context. Under the Supreme Court's holding, a lower
federal court must first review Haley's ineffective assistance of counsel
claim as a freestanding claim for relief and as an argument for cause to
excuse the procedurally defaulted insufficiency of the evidence claim.30 8
Not only does the Court express a strongly supportive view of Haley's
ineffective assistance of counsel claim, but it also highlights the evidently
relevant fact that the State has promised not to raise any procedural
impediment to this claim.30 9 Such support and reliance by the Court
seemingly implies that any counsel, who fails to object to an unauthorized
habitual offender statute, is automatically ineffective. Thus, it may be
unnecessary for erroneously sentenced petitioners to bother asserting actual
304 Dretke, 124 S. Ct. at 1852 (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 495-96 (1986)
(quotations omitted)).
305 Id. at 1853.
306 Herrera, 506 U.S. at 404 (citing McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 502 (1991)).
307 Dretke, 124 S. Ct. at 1853.
308 Id. at 1852.
309 Id. at 1853.
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innocence, because their "viable" and "significant" ineffective assistance of
counsel claims will axiomatically show cause for any procedural default.31°
In addition, the Supreme Court's Sixth Amendment jurisprudence
supports this possibility. The Court has upheld the right of a defendant to
effective counsel during both the guilt or innocence phase and sentencing
phase of a trial. 311 The Strickland two-pronged test provides the Supreme
Court's analysis for determining the existence or non-existence of
ineffective assistance of counsel.312 First, the defendant bears the burden of
demonstrating that his counsel's performance was "deficient." '313 To avoid
a Sixth Amendment violation, a defendant's counsel must prove reasonably
effective and comport with prevailing professional norms. 3 14 In addition,
the Strickland Court cautioned that federal court scrutiny must be "highly
deferential," and the defendant must overcome a strong presumption that
his counsel acted reasonably.315 Second, the defendant must also carry the
burden of showing that this deficient performance prejudiced his defense.
316
To meet this second prong, the defendant must establish that "there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the
result of the proceeding would have been different."
317
Haley can likely satisfy both elements. Haley has a strong case that
his counsel was deficient, especially in light of the Supreme Court's recent
holding in Wiggins v. Smith.318 There, the Court added to Strickland by
holding that effective counsel includes all reasonable investigations into
potential mitigating evidence and other possible avenues of defense during
the sentencing phase of a trial.31 9 In Wiggins, the Court reversed a lower
court's finding of effective assistance of counsel, reasoning that any
reasonable counsel would have comprehensively investigated the
defendant's background, which included a history of prevalent dysfunction,
310 Id; see also Larry J. Ritchie, Justice in Rhode Island: Edson Toro and Procedural
Default, 9 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REv. 455, 489 n.103 (2004) (referring to the Court's
temporal requirement that "ironically makes the 'actual innocence' exception to the
procedural default doctrine even less important").
311 See, e.g., Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003) (finding ineffective assistance of
counsel during the sentencing phase).
312 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
313 Id. at 687.
314 Id. at 687-88.
315 Id. at 689.
316 Id. at 692.
317 Id. at 695.
318 539 U.S. 510 (2003).
319 Id. at 521-22 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91).
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during the sentencing phase of a murder trial.32 ° While defense counsel is
permitted to make strategic decisions with regard to the evidence it chooses
to present, such decisions may be made only after reasonable
investigation.321 In Dretke, Haley's counsel during the sentencing phase
arguably performed even worse than that in Wiggins. At a bare minimum, a
reasonable attorney would have almost certainly analyzed the applicability
of a sentencing statute to his client during a habitual offender sentencing
phase. In addition, Haley can likely meet the burden of showing prejudice.
But for the fact that his counsel failed to notice the inapplicability of
Texas's habitual offender statute, a jury would not have sentenced Haley to
sixteen-and-a-half years in prison.322
In Dretke, the Supreme Court's requirement that Haley exhaust his
concededly strong ineffective assistance of counsel claim before asserting
actual innocence leaves the role of the actual innocence exception in a state
of flux. If defense counsel is almost always ineffective when it fails to
object to an unauthorized habitual offender sentence, then it is unclear
whether the actual innocence exception exists in the noncapital sentencing
context, at least in any meaningful capacity. A petitioner need not bother
asserting actual innocence in addition to an ineffective assistance of counsel
claim, if the latter claim will always prove meritorious. Yet while the
Dretke Court, at least for now, can avoid deciding whether the actual
innocence exception exists in noncapital sentencings, this postponement
will undoubtedly end. In the future, the Court will be faced with the
situation where a petitioner, wrongfully sentenced under a habitual offender
statute, raises only an actual innocence argument. Or a situation will arise
where a habeas petitioner, unlike Haley, failed to raise his ineffective
assistance of counsel claim on direct appeal and thus procedurally defaulted
this argument. In either of these situations, the Supreme Court will be
320 Id. at 524.
321 Id. at 521-22.
322 Haley's ineffective assistance of counsel claim might even have the presumption of
prejudice under the rule laid out in United States v. Cronic. 466 U.S. 648, 658 (1984)
("There are, however, circumstances that are so likely to prejudice the accused that the cost
of litigating their effect in a particular case is unjustified."). Where defense counsel acts as a
"mere spectator" during his client's sentencing, the Fifth Circuit has applied the Cronic
presumption of prejudice. Tucker v. Day, 969 F.2d 155, 159 (5th Cir. 1992) (prejudice
presumed where, even though the defendant did not receive an illegal sentence, his counsel
did nothing during a resentencing phase). The court will also presume prejudice when
counsel is somehow absent from trial, or a judge or the State interfered with counsel's ability
to provide vigorous advocacy. See, e.g., Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 318 (1974)
(prejudice presumed when judge denies counsel's right to cross-examine); Green v. Am, 809




forced to address the actual innocence controversy and what its existence
means, if anything, in the noncapital sentencing context.
2. The Court Has Prolonged Haley's Incarceration Because of the Mistakes
of Haley's Counsel and the Lower Courts, Not the Petitioner Himself
It should be pointed out that Haley, in raising both ineffective
assistance of counsel and actual innocence claims, did nothing wrong. It
was, in fact, both the district court and the Fifth Circuit that chose to
consider only his actual innocence claim.323 As if Haley had not served
enough time in prison before commencing his federal habeas petition,
Haley's already unjust incarceration will be prolonged even more, because
the district court and the court of appeals failed to address his ineffective
assistance of counsel claim initially. Throughout the Supreme Court's
various attempts to balance a petitioner's interest in his own liberty with the
comity and finality of state court decisions, the Court has tried to refrain
from punishing habeas petitioners from mistakes attributable solely to poor
counsel.324 The Carrier avoidance principle itself maintained that most
victims of a miscarriage of justice will fulfill the cause-and-prejudice
standard.325 With a Court so concerned with punishing habeas petitioners
for the mistakes of counsel, the Court should have been similarly concerned
with punishing Haley for the mistakes of the lower federal courts, which
were even further removed from his control than his counsel. The Supreme
Court could have ended this incarceration, but rather chose to continue
Haley's punishment, a punishment due only to the errors of his attorney and
the lower federal courts.
VI. CONCLUSION
In Dretke, the Supreme Court held that a federal habeas petitioner
could not assert the actual innocence exception to the cause-and-prejudice
standard until after federal review of the petitioner's other nondefaulted
claims and arguments for cause on procedurally defaulted claims.326 The
Court adhered to this strict procedural requirement despite the
323 Haley v. Cockrell, 306 F.3d 257, 264-68 (5th Cir. 2002).
324 In Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 100 (1977), Justice Brennan, in his dissent,
framed that the question for the treatment of procedurally defaulted claims as: "How should
the federal habeas court treat a procedural default in a state court that is attributable purely
and simply to the error or negligence of a defendant's trial counsel?"
325 Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 495-96 (1986) (quoting Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S.
107, 135 (1982)).
326 Dretke v. Haley, 124 S. Ct. 1847, 1852 (2004).
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incontrovertible error of Haley's sentence 327 and despite the fact that this
rigid adherence would prolong Haley's incarceration. In reaching this
holding, the Court avoided answering the larger question that has split the
circuit courts: whether the actual innocence exception applies to noncapital
sentencing cases.328 While the Court has found comfort in the principle that
it should avoid both expanding habeas doctrine and reaching tough
constitutional issues unless absolutely necessary, 329 this reluctance is sure to
provide Haley with little solace as he continues to serve a sentence now
more than four years longer than it should have been.33°
Eric Seinsheimer
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